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an appeal upon pure questions of law and mixed questions
of law and fact to the Supreme Court, according to that
general policy of the law which leaves questions of fact to
be conclusively settled by the Court which hears the testimony and refers only questions of law to the appellate tribunal. All those mixed questions which lie upon the border line of law and fact would gradually be relegated to the
former class upon which the decision of the Commission,
as a Federal Court, would be final. Much of the disfavor
with which the courts now regard the findings and decisions
of the Commission originate in a natural feeling of jealousy
and of hostility to the usurpation of judicial powers. The
effect of the system above outlined would be to produce a
uniform and consistent body of interstate commerce law,
judicially expounded and efficiently enforced.

THE RECIPROCITY ACTS OF 189o-ARE THEY
CONSTITUTIONAL?
BY EDWARD B. WVHITNZY, ESQ.

"Whenever the President shall be satisfied that unjust discriminations are made" by a foreign State against American products, "he may
direct that such products of such foreign State, . . . as he may deem
proper, shall be excluded from the United States," and may "revoke,
modify, terminate or renew any such direction as in his opinion the public interest may require."
"With a view to securing reciprocal trade with countries producing
the following articles, . . . whenever and so often as the President
shall be satisfied that the Government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, raw and uncured, or any
of such articles, imposing duties or other exactions upon the agricultural
or other products of the United States, which, in ziew of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides into the United
States,he may deem to be reciprocallyunequaland unreasonable, he shall
have the power, and it shall be his duty," to issue a proclamation levying, instead, certain fixed taxes upon "such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea
and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem
just." 2
'Food Act of August i, I89O, 5.
2
McKinley Tariff Act of October 1,1890,
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These two clauses comprise the famous reciprocity
legislation of the Fifty-first Congress. Both have been questioned as unconstitutional. The latter has been challenged
in the courts, and at the hour of this writing is awaiting the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.'
Reciprocity, however, is not the feature that is challenged. Reciprocity laws and retaliation laws have come
down to us from time immemorial. Their validity is unquestioned and unquestionable. They will last as long as
protective tariffs and commercial restrictions. They exist
not only between nations, but between the different States
of our Union,2 and even in the latter case their constitutionality has years since been sustained by the supreme tribunal.
Nor may the legislation be brought in question before
the courts as a possible violation of treaty rights. Such an
opposition was made in Congress, and with grave reason.
Many or most of our treaties contain the well-known "mostfavored nation" clause, or something stronger. With such
a clause the levying of special import duties may be difficult
to reconcile. But the Constitution is not violated when a
statute expressly or impliedly repeals a treaty.4 One is as
much the law of the land as the other. Nobody can complain but the foreign nation whose treaty rights are broken,
and that complaint must be made to the executive, not to
the judicial branch of our government. It is a question of
diplomacy and not of law.
The Reciprocity Acts of 189o are met with the charge
that they are not complete laws in themselves; with the
charge that they are a delegation of the legislative power
and duty of Congress to an individual, the PresidentV of the
United States. The laying of a tax is a legislative act.5
So is the regulation of commerce in times of peace. The
I Boyd, Sutton & Co. v. U. S.; H. Herrman Sternbach & Co. v. U. S.,
argued November, i89 i . [Since decided, February 29, 1892.]
2 "Commercial Retaliation between the States," Am. Law Review,
Feb., 1885.
8 Fire Association v. New York, ii9 U. S., iio.
4Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S., 581 ; Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U. S., 19o; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S., 580, 599.
-'New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S., i8, 31.
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discretion of the Legislature is exercised upon two main
problems in the consideration of a proposed statute. One
is, whether there is a mischief calling for a remedy. The
other is the nature and extent of the remedy to be applied.
In the McKinley Act the former problem especially, in the
Food Act the latter, is left entirely to the President for
solution. Of the two distinctively legislative functions,
each statute delegates one. If this is constitutional, then
both functions may be delegated in the same statute.
Then it will be constitutional for Congress to say to the
President: "If you think foreign tariffs are unreasonable,
you may exclude at your discretion any or all foreign products, or you may tax*them." For the power to exclude
involves the power to impose license fees,' and that is the
power to tax.
The discussion thus reopened is one of the oldest and
most fundamental, while one of the most difficult and obscure and most unsettled, in all our jurisprudence. The
first provision of the Federal Constitution is, that "All
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." State constitutions contain
similar provisions. In Federal and State courts alike the
general principle has always been laid down and never
been disputed, that the legislative power cannot be delegated.2 Some State courts have gone so far as to deny
the right of the Legislature to consult its principal, the people themselves, by a referendum ;3 others have allowed

this, while still denying the right to delegate to a subagent.4 All courts have allowed certain exceptions to the
rule, such as a power to grant local self-government to
municipalities, by immemorial usage,6 and a power to leave
mere questions of detail to be worked out by the judiciary
' See Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall, 73.
Vayman v. Southard, Io Wheat., 1, 42-3; Bank of U. S. v. Halstead, id. 51, 6r; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S., 545, 56o; People's R. R. v.
Memphis R. R., Io Wall, 38, 50.
3 Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483.
4
Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St., 491; Cooley Const. Lim., 6th ed., pp.
i4o-46.
5Paul v. Gloucester County, 5o N. 3. Law, 585
2
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or executive.I Moreover, as most statutes must be conditional, waiting for some given state of facts to exist to call
them into operation, the power to decide whether or not
that time has arrived must be delegated to the judiciary or
to the executive.
This latter is, in fact, the judicial or executive province ; but, like the exceptions above mentioned, it necessarily involves a really wide limit of quasi-legislative discretion. Still, if our courts have not been for a century in
error, " there is a boundary somewhere between those
great essential acts of legislative judgment, the power to
perform which cannot be delegated, and those discretionary
powers which may be. The Legislature could not, under
the guise of enacting a conditional law, provide that whatever the President might thereafter enact or proclaim
should have the force of law." 2 "It will not be contended
that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any tribunal,
powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." '
"The general proposition," says Solicitor-General TAFT,
in his able brief for the government upon the McKinley
Act, "that Congress has no power to delegate its legislative
power to the Executive is conceded."
The Solicitor-General defends the act, first, upon authority of the brig Aurora, 7 Cranch, 362; second, by the
claim that it follows a line of statutes, extending over a
century of time, so unbroken and unquestioned as to constitute a practical construction of the Constitution which
it is now too late to re-examine. We believe that neither
of these defences is well founded, and that in fact the present question comes before us unaffected by precedent and
to be decided simply upon its merits.
The brig Aurora came before the Court in 1813, un-

der the Non-importation Laws of 18o9 and 381o. We had
become embroiled with both England and France, then
hotly engaged in the greatest war of modern history. We
claimed certain commercial rights as a neutral party. EngIWayman

v. Southard, io Wheat., I, 42-3 ; In re Griner, I6 Wis., 423.
2 Paine, J., i'z re Oliver, 17 Wis., 681.
3 Chief Justice Marshall in Wayinan v. Southard, io Wheat., I, 42.
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land and France denied the claim. The former by her Orders in Council, Napoleon by his Berlin and Milan Decrees,
violated, as we claimed, our neutral commerce. It may
have been true in international law that our claims were
excessive and our rights doubtful. But as a matter of
American law the case was clear. For the claims of the
administration were well known, and in matters of international dispute it has been regarded as conceded that the
courts must follow the lead of the political branch of the
government.' When Congress and the President have
spoken, it would ill become the judiciary to take the side
of the foreigner. Under these circumstances the non-importation acts 2 were passed, closing our ports to the trade

of our commercial enemies.
But these acts authorized the President, "In case either
France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts
as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of
the United States, to declare the same by proclamation,"
upon which trade should be renewed. That is, the President was simply made the judge, to find the fact and apply
the well-recognized and then familiar rules of law. His
proclamation, like the finding of a lunacy commission, was
but the official evidence of the fact. It was not thle less a
judicial or executive, rather than.a legislative act, because
there could be no review of his decision by any other tribunal. He was no more a despot in this respect than Weas,
until last year, the Federal Circuit Judge in a case involving a sum less than the $5,000 necessary to warrant an appeal. It is common to'leave such a question to an executive officer to decide, his decision being final. 3 For this

IChief Justice Marshall in U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat., 61o, 635 ; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat., 246, 324 (recognition of Haytian insurgents);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet., 414, 420 (ownership of Falkland
Islands); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253, 307 (boundaries of Louisiana purchase); Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet., 511 (do.); Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S., 130
(cession of Alexandria from District of Columbia to Virginia); Jones v.
U. S.,2 137 U. S., 202 (ownership of Guano Islands).
Acts of March I, 18o9; May I, 18io.
3
Martin v. Mott, I2,Wheat., i; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co., IS How., 272, 28o.
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reason, in the brig Aurora, the statute was sustained, as
appears both by the briefs of counsel and by the opinion of
the Court.
The distinction from the present statute is apparent.
The President is now directed to impose duties upon the
imports of any nation whose "exactions" on our products,
"'in view of" our rather modest free list, 'he may deem to
be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." There is, and
can be, no standard of comparison. It is impossible to
formulate a rule, or anything nearer than a guess, as to the
definition or the measurement of reciprocal unreasonableness. No court could pass upon such a question. The
whole labored structure amounts but to saying that the
President may impose the duties in his discretion as against
any nation but one absolutely under the dominion of free
trade. The discretion does not concern details alone, but
the broadest principles of action. Its exercise is in every
sense a legislative act.
Is there, then, such a uniform course of legislation as
to justify so clear a departure from fundamental principles
of government? Usage is indeed a powerful, sometimes a
controlling, factor in constitutional discussions. But in
the construction of statutes and constitutions, as of contracts, the usage given such effect has been long, continuous and generally acquiesced in.' Our history, on the
contrary, shows four stages in the progress of retaliatory
legislation ; first, a form loose like the present, and for the
time unquestioned; then a great debate over the right to
delegate legislative power; then eighty years of precedents, beginning with the act of i8o9 just quoted, in
which correct rules were more or less strictly followed;
-finally, and with the past five years, a relapse into the first
condition.
On June 4, 1794, Congress replied to the British
Orders in Council by an act authorizing President WASHINGTON to lay a general embargo, "whenever in his opinion
the public safety shall so require, ....
.
under such
'See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 315; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16
Pet., 621; Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, IIi U. S., 53, 57; The Lama,
114 U. S., 4I.
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regulations as the circumstances of the case may require;"
to be laid, however, only during the recess, and to last only
fifteen days after the next meeting of Congress. The act
was passed unanimously, without discussion.' On February 9, 1799, and February 26, i8oo, Congress passed, again
without discussion upon this point,2 acts giving like power
to President JOHN ADAMS.

On February 28 and Decem-

ber io, i8o6, acts were similarly passed, giving to President JEFFERSON temporary power to suspend the embargo in

his discretion. All of these statutes were enacted hurriedly,
in expectation of foreign war, and in times when Congress
could not be called in extra session without two months'
delay.3
The constitutional question was first raised, apparently, upon a bill enacted April 22, 18o8, again authorizing the suspensionof the embargo. A debate ensued in
each house of Congress. The speeches in the Senate are
not reported, but the bill seems to have been stoutly resisted as a delegation of legislative power.' The discussion
in the lower House is reported at great length. JOHN RANDOLPH, of Roanoke, led the opposition to the bill, but the
legal arguments were supplied by the then famous lawyer,
PHILIP BARTON KEY, of Maryland. Mr. KEY took the
positionof the present opponents of the McKinley law: "Let

us say that when such events (designating them) happen,
the law shall be suspended, and let the President give them
publicity by proclamation." The contraryis "themostantirepublican doctrine ever advocated upon the floor of this
House." "I do not say that we cannot give the President,
upon certain predicated events, a power by which the embargo may be taken off. Such may be done." But if the
President be left to "exercise his judgment"I as to What
events shall be sufficient, "it is the exercise of a legislative
power. I"5 Mr. JOSIAH QUINCY, of Massachusetts, and others
IAnnals of Congress, April ig, 1808, p. 2,230.
2Annals of Congress, April 14, i8o8, p. 2,144.
3Id., DcC. 21, i8o8, p. 295; April ig, I808, p. 2,216.
4Id., Dec. 21, i8o8, p. 259; Jan. 7, 1809,P. 315.
5Annals of Congress, April 13, i8o8, pp. 2,124-5; April i8, i8o8, p.
2,212.
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on both sides, argued that the question was not constitu-

tional, but of expediency merely.1 Mr.

CAMPBELL,

of Ten-

nessee, who had charge of the bill, took a middle course,
agreeing with the distinction taken by Mr. KEY, but
claiming a wider range of discretion for the President.2
The bill finally passed in a transitional form.' The debate, however, called public attention to the danger of the
earlier forms and future bills, beginning with that of 18o9,
conformed to the theory of Mr. KEY. A debate in the
Senate the following winter 4 seems to have ended the discussion, except in the case of the brig Aurora, until it
was revived by Senator EVARTS over the bill of I89o.'
The Tonnage Act of March 3, 1815, may be taken as
a type of those passed in this intermediate period. It first
repeals every "discriminating duty on tonnage between
foreign vessels and vessels of the United States."
It then
provides that the repeal shall "take effect in favor of any
foreign nation, whenever the President of the United States
shall be satisfied that the discriminatingor countervailing
duties of such foreign nation, so far as they operate to the
disadvantage of the United States, have been abolished."
For the phrase, "shall be satisfied," such expression as
" upon satisfactory evidence being given to the President"
is often substituted. This does not impart an untrammelled or quasi-legislative act of discretion, but is a term
commonly used in relation to judicial proceedings. Illustrations of this will probably occur to all practising lawyers. "Satisfactory evidence" means "sufficient evidence."' An applicant for a warrant of attachment in New
1 Annals of Congress, April 14, 18S,

pp. 2,129-30; April 19, i8oS, pp.

2,200-2.

2

1d., April 13, 188o, pp. 2141-4.
3"In the event of such peace or suspension of hostilities between
the belligerent powers of Europe, or of such changes in their measures
affecting neutral commerce as may render that of the United States sufficiently safe, in the judgment of the President of the United States, he is
hereby authorized" to suspend the embargo till twenty days after the
next meeting of Congress.
4

Annals of Congress, Dec., i8o8; Jan., 1809, pp. 245-319.

5

Congr. Record, September 8, 1S9o, p. 9,S82.
6 Act of January 7, 1824.
71 Greenleaf on Evidence,

2.

ARE THEY CONSTITUTIONAL?

York must "make affidavit to the satisfaction of the judge
granting the same,"' yet the decisions of the judges are reviewable, and in fact are constantly under review, upon appeal. So when one contracts to do a job to the satisfaction
of another, the latter's decision must be reasonable ; and it
is subject to the regulation of a jury, except the job be such
as the painting of a portrait or fitting of a suit of clothes,
dependent entirely upon personal taste .2 The question of
disadvantage to the United States, within the meaning of
the statute in discriminating or countervailing duties, is
one that can be judicially solved. It is merely the question
whether American vessels and their cargoes are treated as
well by the foreign government as are those of its own
"
citizens.
The last of this series of constitutional acts was passed
in i886.' The first of the present doubtful series was the
Canadian Retaliation Act of March 3, 1887. This law is
very. objectionable in form,5 although supposed by its
framers to follow the precedent of its predecessors, but is
too recent to be valuable as a precedent, and has already
been referred to with doubt by the courts. 6 -The constitu'N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, ? 636.
2Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, ioi N. Y., 387.
3See also the following acts for various forms: Acts of March 3, 1817;
March I, 1823; January 7, 1824; April 20, 1826; May 24, 1828; May 21,
i83o; May i9and July 13, 1832; March 3, 1845; June 26, 1884. Special
Acts of June 30, 1834, and March 2, 1839, relating to Cuba, Porto Rico
and Belgium, are more objectionable in form; but the variation seems to
have been unnoticed, and they never came up for judicial review.
4
Act of June i9,i886.
5 "Whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied"
that American fishermen in Canadian waters "are or then lately have
been denied or abridged in the enjoyment of any rights secured to them
by treaty or law, or are or then lately have been unjustly vexed or harassed in the enjoyment of such rights; or subjected to unreasonable restrictions, regulations or requirements in respect of such rights or otherwise unjustly vexed or harassed," he may (with certain discretionary exceptions), by proclamation, close American ports to Canadian craft and
forbid the importation of Canadian goods, and "may in his discretion apply such proclamation to any or to all of the foregoing-named subjects,"
with power to revoke, etc.
6 Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N. J. Law, 585, 6oo.
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tional objection was not pressed before Congress in 1887,
but was raised at last over the McKinley Bill in 189o.
Senator EVARTS, his instinct as a lawy&r overcoming his allegiance as a party man, followed in the footsteps of RANDOLPH and KEY, showing that no authority had given the
President the right " to enact arrangements of our revenue
system upon his deliberation of what are fair and proper
equivalents between nations in that regard," to make
treaties without the Senate and pass revenue bills without
the House. His amendment, however, that the President,
instead of acting on his own discretion, should communicate
the facts to Congress, was defeated by 34 votes to 30.1
The question thus faces us unhampered by authority:
Can Congress invest the President with its own full powers
in the field of legislation, with no exception in favor of the
exports of a country enjoying absolutely free trade? "There
is perhaps no class of questions ever presented for judicial
consideration which involve more real difficulty or leave
greater room for the mind to remain in doubt than
those which involve the boundaries between that
legislative power which cannot be delegated, and those
discretionary powers which the legislature may intrust to
other departments or persons in the execution of the
laws." 2 In the words of ChiefJustice MARSHALL, "The line
has not been exactly drawn. . . . The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes
the law; but the maker of the law may commit something
to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise
boundary of this power is a subject of delicate inquiry into
3
which a court will not enter unnecessarily.
Analogies favoring a practically boundless range of
discretion may be drawn from the powers given to the
President in times of war or of rumors of war. At such a
time the nation's safety demands that the courts shall not
interfere, nor will they do so, whether the war be with a
1 Congr. Record, Sept. 8-9, 1890, pp. 9,882, 9,9o6.
2 Paine, J., In re Oliver, 17 Wis., 681.

3 Chief Justice Marshall, in Wayman v. Southard, Io Wheat., r.
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foreign enemy or with insurrectionary forces.' If a request
is made of the President to call out the militia, the courts
will not review the questi.n whether the call came from
the proper source, 2 or whether his acts as Commander-inChief were legal. His decision is judicial and final, as
"necessarily results from the nature of the power itself-;
a prompt unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable. "3 Some acts have gone very far in authorizing
him in his discretion after war is begun, to regulate intercourse with hostile territory,' or suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.5 It may be doubted, however, whether these statutes
are really operative at all ; whether, as in the case of amnesty,'it would not be held that he could do the same things
without them. His commission as Commander-in-Chief
comes direct from the Constitution, and has the widest scope
in the realm of war and over conquered territory, while it is
powerless to invade the rights of the citizen, except where
necessities of war demand. Thus, by his own authority,
he can establish provisional courts,7 or even organize governments and levy taxes 3 in conquered districts, while away
from the field of conflict Congress itself cannot give him
the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as against
suspected citizens.'
Analogous to war, however, in its sudden dangers and
necessarily violent remedies, is the invasion of a contagious
disease. It is not possible to guard against such a disaster
except by giving to the Executive the fullest and quickest
right of action. In this field the Constitution gives no
direct commission to the President. His powers and those
of the departments, given by acts of Congress, are legis'U. S. v. Lee, io6 U. S., 196,

209;

Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668-

7o, and cases infra.
2

Luther v. Borden, 7 How.. I, 43.
sMr. Justice Story, in Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19.
'Act of July 13, i.R6i ; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall, 73.
6Act of March 3, 1863.
6U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall, 128.
7 The Bark Grapeshot, 9 Wall, 129.
$Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164 ; Leitensderfer v. Webb, 20 How.,
276.

9

Exfparle Milligan, 4 Wall, i.
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lative in their range of discretion as to diseases of men or
animals. "In his judgment," he may allow importation
of neat-cattle when there is no danger of disease.' When
"satisfied that there is good reason to believe" that adulterated food, drink or drugs, "to any extent dangerous to
the health or welfare of the people of the United States or
any of them, " are about to be imported, he may proclaim
non-importation "for such period of time as he may think
We are not aware that those enactments
necessary. '
have yet been brought to the bar to plead their constitutionality. It may, however, be that these powers will be
sustained as being valid only so far as they impose upon
him the duty to do what it is every man's right to do; that
is, to abate a public nuisance.'
If,in other departments of legislation, Congress may
delegate its legislative discretion as freely as in the department of public health, then Chief Justice MARSHALL was
wrong, and JOSIAH QUINCY was right.

Congress will con-

sider merely the question of expediency. It should, indeed, exercise its greater latitude of constitutional interpretation to "avoid a measure ,because it approaches the
confines of the Constitution ; "' but if it fails in caution,
there will be no remedy from the courts. The principle of
the division between the three branches of the government
will, in this respect, be regarded merely as a theory unworkable in practice, a visionary project into which our
forefathers were led by their devotion to Mo-xTEsQUIEu,

the political prophet of the eighteenth century.
But if ChiefJustice MARSHALL was right-and there is a
line beyond which the Legislature cannot go-still the question is one of expediency; only in extreme cases will the
Court as well as Congress have a right of judgment The
question will always arise whether, as in the case of the
health laws, it is absolutely necessary to the public welfare
that legislative discretion be delegated to executive officers.
I Act of March 3. 1866, R. S., 2,494.
2

Food Act of August 19, 1890, 4.
66-7.
Compare Wood on Nuisances,
4Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264.
3
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Of the general rules, so far as rules will be found which
may regulate the decisions upon these questions, it is, of
course, impossible to treat. Each statute will be judged
by its own provisions and by the circumstances which call
it forth ; if it is impossible to carry on a safe and effective
government without the delegation of power, then the
delegation will be sustained.
But if the courts overrule the opinion of Chief Justice
MARSHALL, and leave the question of expediency entirely to
the legislature, then we are in a condition of theoretical,
and, perhaps, soon may be in a condition of practical,
danger. The tendency of the present time is toward the
extension of executive power. This is fostered by the fact
that in the nation, as-in many of the States, the varying
rates of growth between different portions of the country
tend to increase the likelihood of the legislature remaining
for long terms of years in the control of a minority party.
Not only has the law tended toward a concentration of
power in the hands of a single individual, but leaders in
both the political parties, within a very short time, have
shown a willingness and determination to grasp at authority
without respect to the ancient traditions of our commonwealths. It is no idle speculation, therefore, to consider
what may be done if Congress has the power to hand over
its functions to a political leader of our new school of
statesmen. Such speculations may easily be made, but are
not practicable within the bounds of this article. A bill,
actually introduced a few weeks since 1 in the United States
Senate, by Senator TELLER, of Colorado, gives us a single

instance. This'bill, if enacted, will authorize the President to call together the nations of the world in conference
upon the silver question, inviting the so-called "Latin
Union" and such other nations as shall please him. If
any three of these nations shall then agree with him as to
the ratio between the silver and the gold dollar, he will
have the authority to issue a proclamation fixing that value
with the same conclusiveness as if it had been deliberately
'January II, 1892.
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enacted by act of Congress. If he shall conclude it to be
advisable for national or party purposes that the ratio
of silver to gold should be twelve to one instead of sixteen
to one, he need but invite Hayti, Costa Rica and the
Transvaal Republic to his conference, and, by securing
their adhesion, obtain the power to upset the financial
standards of the United States. Many cases could be put
in which the ruling party could, for a considerable time,
perpetuate its power in a situation like that of the second
session of the Fifty-first Congress. President, Senate and
House of Representatives then belonged to the same political party, and had it in their power to make the laws.
They knew that on the fourth day of March then next
ensuing the opposition would obtain control of one branch
of Congress, so that for two years party legislation would
be impossible. If a Congress has an unlimited right of
delegation, a series of acts could easily, and might in the
future, perhaps, not improbably, be passed, -which should
secure to the President the right of legislation during those
two years; while the ensuing Congress would simply and
easily, by the ordinary parliamentary processes, be stifled
in a deadlock.
Thus the power to delegate involves the power to
create a limited dictatorship. Such considerations are of
grave importance in passing upon a constitutional question.
They are not, however, entirely conclusive. "It is no
answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no
power which is not susceptible of abuse.'
It is possible, indeed probable, that the qu~estion will
not be settled upon the present consideration of the McKinley Act. The President has as yet issued no proclamation under his retaliatory powers. The point has been
taken in the Federal Supreme Court by importers of wearing apparel, whose claim is that the whole tariff legislation
is void on account of the alleged invalidity of this one
clause. It may, perhaps, be that the bill would not have
passed the Senate if it had not been for this concession to
'Mr. Justice Story, in Martin v. Mott,
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1g.

ARE THEY CONSTITUTIONAL?

the principles of free trade. It was charged by an influential leader and by a section of the followers of the party
which advocated the measure that without this clause the
bill would not have found a new market for a single bushel
of American wheat or a single pound of pork. Whether
or not, however, the bill was carried through by this provision will never be known; nor, could it be known, would
the court consider such an argument for the purpose of
overthrowing the bill's constitutionality. The question
whether the reciprocity clause is separable from the rest of
the act is one of law, not of history. To decide the question in the affirmative might be judicially to accomplish a
fraud upon the Senators and their constituents ; but many
frauds go unpunished in this world and even (if the insti-.
gator duly repent) in tle next.
If the President proclaims a tax upon the exports of
any foreign country, under the provisions of this measure,
its constitutionality will doubtless be .disputed, and the
question at last come before the Supreme Court for decision.
If our arguments are well founded, that court will not be
able to sustain the measure without overthrowing all
vestiges of the ancient principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated, unless the position be taken in
analogy to the decisions of the courts in the boundary
cases and others which we have cited, that for the credit of
the Federal Government in its dealings with foreign
countries, no act will be pronounced unconstitutional upon
whose constitutionality the President has based diplomatic
negotiations. There would be analogy for such a decision
in the cases cited. But even in foreign relations the
scope allowed him has not been unlimited. When President JOHN ADAMS assumed, in excess of the powers granted
him by the Non-intercourse Act of 1799, to stop importations in foreign vessels, Chief Justice MARSHALL, and the
Supreme Court, after grave hesitancy, decided that his
orders were void and afforded no protection to the naval
officers who acted under them.1
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